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Investing Our Way Out of the Crisis?
The debate over how public investment banks in Europe can promote 
growth
by Katharina Ehrhart and Claudia Schmucker
In June 2013 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that the role of  fiscal multipli-
ers had been underestimated in terms of  GDP growth. This sparked a new debate on the negative 
effects of  austerity measures and a discussion of  the need for more public spending. In this context, 
the idea of  increased investment financing through public investment banks has gained momentum 
in Europe. The European Investment Bank (EIB) is well placed to fill the existing investment 
gap through favorable loans, particularly to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
The economic situation in Europe
The aftermath of  the 2008 global financial crisis 
and the ensuing Eurozone crisis from 2010 onward 
revealed high levels of  public and private debt. Per-
sistent unemployment and stagnating growth pose 
further challenges to policy makers. Though Euro-
stat announced in August that GDP had grown in 
the Eurozone by 0.3 percent in the second quarter 
of  2013, after six quarters of  negative growth, the 
recovery remains shaky and there is still a large gap 
between north and south. According to the IMF 
World Economic Outlook update of  July 2013, the 
Euro area will remain in recession in 2013, with 
overall output activity decreasing by over .5 per-
cent. The IMF predicts that growth will rise less 
than 1 percent in 2014—lower than previously pre-
dicted—due to a more protracted recession.1
Efforts to respond to the economic and financial 
problems of  such economically troubled Euro-
zone countries as Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, 
and Cyprus has often focused on deficit reduc-
tion and structural reforms. These have provoked 
complaints from governments and members of  
civil society that the so-called “austerity agenda” is 
detrimental to growth, inspiring anti-German and 
anti-EU sentiments. The prevalence of  a high level 
of  public and private debt, however, has narrowed 
the ability of  governments to adopt an alternative 
approach.
Austerity versus deficit spending: 
the debate over fiscal multipliers
Discussion of  how to find a way out of  the crisis 
has often been reduced to the dichotomy austerity 
versus growth. In fact, the real dichotomy faced by 
policy makers is fiscal adjustments (austerity) versus 
deficit spending. Both austerity and deficit spending 
have the same objective, namely long-term growth. 
In general, the short-term focus of  fiscal adjust-
ment is on deficit reduction, intended to regain 
investors’ confidence and thereby trigger growth.2 
Theoretically underpinned by Harvard economist 
Alberto Alesina in a briefing for the ECOFIN 
Council, fiscal adjustment as a preferred crisis 
response has gained more influence in the Troika 
programs.3 In contrast, the proponents of  defi-
cit spending generally criticize the supporters of  
austerity policies for wrongly assuming that public 
spending cuts are counterbalanced by the private 
sector. In their view, high private debt and low con-
sumer confidence only lead to even lower invest-
ment and lower spending. This in turn reduces 
economic output and deepens the recessions in 
economically troubled countries.4 More public 
spending, they argue, is therefore needed in order 
to enhance growth and shrink the debt-to-GDP 
ratio in the long run. This faction is grounded in 
Keynesian thinking and powerfully represented by 
Nobel Laureate and Princeton economics professor 
Paul Krugman.5
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Controversy over these two approaches revolves 
around the issue of  fiscal multipliers—and around 
one question in particular: how positive is the 
impact of  public spending on growth, or, cor-
respondingly, how negative are the effects of  
austerity measures on the GDP? Alesina and oth-
ers claim that the impact of  fiscal multipliers on 
growth is negligible and that the multiplier value 
is most likely less than one.6 This means that the 
negative effects of  raising taxes and cutting pub-
lic spending on the GDP is low. In contrast, the 
IMF concluded in its June 2013 evaluation of  
the program for Greece that the effects of  fiscal 
multipliers had been underestimated; instead of  a 
multiplier of  .5, it was twice the original estimate.7 
According to the IMF, this means spending cuts 
have damaged GDP growth in Greece more than 
had been originally predicted. If  the fiscal mul-
tiplier is one, then GDP is reduced by the exact 
amount of  the spending cuts. This debate is cen-
tral in the ongoing discussion in Europe on how 
to achieve growth.
Europe: “golden rule” and public 
investment banks
The debate on fiscal multipliers has sparked a new 
discussion of  how to achieve growth. Recently, the 
idea of  deficit spending has gained more influence 
again. In July 2013 José Manuel Barroso, president 
of  the European Commission, stressed at the 
European Parliament that the Commission was 
considering excluding public investment expendi-
ture from the deficit requirements in the Stability 
and Growth Pact. The aim was to address the 
problems some crisis countries are experiencing by 
drawing on the EU’s structural and cohesion funds. 
Funding is only available through EU budget pro-
grams for co-financing—specifically, under the 
“Structural and Cohesion policy,” “Trans-European 
Networks,” or “Connecting Europe Facility”—to 
which both the EU and the member state have to 
contribute.8 This could be difficult for indebted 
countries. The proposed changes would enable 
those countries to spend more money on public 
investment—through projects carried out in col-
laboration with the EU’s structural and cohesion 
funds—without violating the budget deficit rules.
The Commission’s demand is not new. In a memo 
on the monetary union from 1990, it agued that 
“the Golden Rule of  Public Finance … appears 
the most satisfactory [fiscal rule] from an analyti-
cal point of  view.”9 The Golden Rule of  Public 
Finance allows room for deficit spending—as long 
as it is used to finance investment. However, those 
member states that have used a Golden Rule in the 
past have changed their fiscal frameworks in the 
meantime. The UK suspended its Golden Rule in 
2008,10 and Germany replaced its Golden Rule of  
Article 115 Grundgesetz with the so-called “debt 
brake” in 2011, which later became the model for 
the Fiscal Treaty.11 There seems to be growing polit-
ical consensus that this form of  fiscal rule gives too 
much discretion to governments. Other concerns 
involve worries that public investment could crowd 
out private investment.12 However, if  the propo-
nents of  deficit spending are right about the effect 
of  fiscal multipliers, this would deprive govern-
ments of  a powerful instrument to stimulate growth.
To avoid this dilemma, the attention in Europe is 
now shifting to banks to fuel growth in times of  
crisis. Since some European countries do not have 
the funds to increase their spending, the European 
Commission has additionally focused on “new 
schemes … developed by the Commission and the 
EIB with the involvement of  the ECB” as a means 
to finance investment.13 The problem—generally 
referred to as the “broken transmission mecha-
nism”—lies in the fact that the [exceptionally] low 
ECB key interest rate—currently 0.5 percent—is 
not reaching the real economy.14 Banks can borrow 
very cheaply from their central banks but are reluc-
tant to pass the credits on to businesses. According 
to a study by the Brussels think tank Bruegel, the 
annual growth rate of  credit in the Euro area has 
not exceeded 2 percent, in comparison to 10 per-
cent before the crisis.15 Public investment banks are 
well placed to fill this existing credit gap.
In this context, the European Investment Bank 
(EIB), which was created in 1958, has gained wider 
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attention. The EIB is owned by EU member states, 
whose shares depend on their respective economic 
weight within the EU (GDP) at the time of  their 
accession. The EIB raises money through issuing 
bonds and has the highest credit rating, as its bor-
rowing is guaranteed by the member states. The 
EIB can therefore dispose of  large sums, which 
it can leverage to achieve an even greater impact 
when it lends to the real economy. These loans are 
given at very favorable terms.16 Altogether, the EIB 
has six priorities for projects: These include SMEs, 
regional development, environmental sustainability, 
innovation, trans-European networks (transport), 
and energy.17 In all, 90 percent of  the EIB loans go 
into EU member states. Projects in 2013 included 
loans to a research and development (R&D) pro-
gram for exhaust technology (Germany); loans 
to school building projects (Ireland) and campus 
development (UK); loans for investment in the 
electricity grid (Spain); and loans for R&D in Pol-
ish research institutes, universities, and businesses.18
The EIB has now been assigned a central role in 
the “New Investment Plan for Europe” launched 
by the European Council at its June 2013 summit. 
Already in June 2012, EU member states agreed 
to increase the EIB’s capital by 10 billion Euros 
in order to raise its lending capacity by 60 billion 
Euros (2012 “Compact for Jobs and Growth”).19 In 
addition, at the June 2013 meeting, the European 
Council called for an increase of  EIB lending in 
the EU by at least 40 percent over the years 2013 
to 2015.20 Here the European Council put a special 
emphasis on SMEs: “Given the importance of  
SMEs for the economy, especially in terms of  job 
creation, measures to support SME financing will 
be a priority.”21 A joint EIB-Commission report 
laid out modes for the EIB to alleviate the financ-
ing constraints of  SMEs. These include joint SME 
guarantee instruments as well as joint securitization 
instruments.22
The EIB-Commission report furthermore aims 
to increase the collaboration between the EIB 
and public investment banks in member states.23 
National public investment banks have equally been 
given greater responsibility in supporting economic 
activity by their governments. The German govern-
ment is currently developing a strategy in which the 
German public investment bank KfW would play 
a role in supporting SMEs in Spain and Portugal.24 
In France, a public investment bank did not exist 
until recently but was created by the government of  
François Hollande in 2012.25 Similarly, Denmark has 
set up a state investment fund.26 The consultancy 
PricewaterhouseCoopers suggested that the creation 
of  a national public investment bank similar to the 
KfW would also be helpful in Greece. In July 2013, 
German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble went 
to Athens together with Ulrich Schröder, CEO of  
the KfW, to discuss the creation of  a Greek devel-
opment bank called “Institution for Growth.”27 In 
this respect, it is interesting to mention another 
detail of  the joint EIB-Commission report: In the 
case of  Greece, unutilized funds from the EU’s 
structural and cohesion funds were passed on to a 
guarantee fund designed for EIB lending to SMEs.28 
This proliferation of  the model of  the German 
public investment bank KfW is a good example of  
the export of  German economic institutions.
Conclusion
Europe needs more measures to support invest-
ment and innovation. In this regard, the role of  
public investment banks, both on the European 
and on the member state national levels, has been 
enhanced by recent EU-level initiatives. While 
strict fiscal adjustments are becoming increasingly 
untenable and public deficit spending faces many 
constraints—such as the Troika conditionality and 
market rates—public investment bank funding has 
emerged as a possible alternative. Public investment 
banks such as the EIB are well placed to provide 
affordable loans, particularly to SMEs, in order to 
foster growth in Europe. Yet the EIB needs more 
than a capital increase of  10 billion Euros to fulfill 
this function. European member states should con-
sider additional capital for the EIB to fund com-
petitive projects. In this context, it is also important 
that the internal procedures allow for fast invest-
ment decisions.
There are nonetheless two caveats to include in 
the discussion of  whether the EU can and should 
invest its way out of  the crisis. There are many 
causes for the present crisis in Eurozone countries 
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that do not stem from a lack of  investment (e. g., 
Spain). Structural reforms and debt reduction in 
individual EU countries are also needed to tackle 
the crisis. From an economic point of  view, it is 
also necessary to ensure that the renewed lend-
ing activities through public investment banks do 
not lead to overinvestment and thereby create new 
macroeconomic imbalances. If  it proves to be 
effective, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure 
can be used as an oversight and to provide checks 
and balances.29 Viewed from a political perspec-
tive, it is the lack of  transparency and democratic 
accountability of  public investment banking that 
causes concern. Taking the responsibility for eco-
nomically vital investment activity out of  demo-
cratic governments and placing it into the hands 
of  unelected institutions represents a technocratic 
shift that is not welcome everywhere. There is an 
increased desire for more transparency on the part 
of  central banks and public investment banks. In 
February 2010, the EIB established a new transpar-
ency policy with improved access to documentation 
of  EIB projects. Still, much needs to be done with 
regard to stakeholder participation.30
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